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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last quarter of the 20
th century has seen a significant increase in wage inequality in the
United States and Great Britain. However, this phenomenon has not been observed for Germany
to a similar extent (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Steiner and Wagner, 1998; Fitzenberger,
1999; Katz and Autor, 1999; Acemoglu, 2003
1). In Germany (and other continental European
countries), a significant rise in unemployment has occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s, which
contrasts with the fall in British and U.S. joblessness rates, especially during the 1990s. This
difference in wage inequality and unemployment developments across the Atlantic led to a view
which is sometimes called the ‘Krugman hypothesis’ (Krugman, 1994). It states that the rise in
wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the rise in unemployment in continental
Europe are ‘two sides of the same coin’, namely a fall in the relative demand for unskilled
workers.
2
This paper uses several (seven in total) person-level data sets to test whether the low
skilled experienced a negative net demand shock in the U.S., Britain, and western Germany in the
1980s and the 1990s and whether relative wage behaviour for the low skilled was rigid in western
Germany but not in the Anglo-Saxon countries. If there is something to the Krugman hypothesis,
then Germany – the country with increasing average unemployment – should have experienced a
change in the unemployment/non-employment structure such that the relative unemployment
likelihood of the unskilled has increased. The U.S. and Britain, however, should have seen a
stable (or converging) unemployment but a flexible wage structure.
3 Unlike previous papers, my
results will point to the crucial role of the German apprenticeship system in shielding a large
1 The large increase in the 90/10 decile ratio reported in Table 1a in Acemoglu (2003) for the early 80s is most likely
due to a change in the underlying original data set for Germany, which occurred in the Luxembourg Income Study
between 1981 and 1984 (http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/ge/geindex.htm).
2 The main reason for this fall in relative demand for unskilled workers seems to be skill-biased technological
change, rather than trade/globalisation (cf. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998; Machin
and Van Reenen, 1998; Pflüger, 2001; Acemoglu, 2002). See Card and DiNardo (2002) for an alternative view for
the U.S. and Goux and Maurin (2000) for France.
3 Figure 1 plots unemployment rates for the U.S., Britain, and Western Germany since the 1960s/1970s. Although
there are some issues concerning comparability mentioned in the note to the figure, one may argue that the
increase in British and German unemployment in the 1980s was more like a ‘catch-up’ to standard U.S. levels. It
was British, not German unemployment that became exceptionally high during this period. However, in the 1990s
both British and U.S. unemployment fell markedly, whereas German unemployment ratched up again. From a
macro perspective one might wonder whether this divergence is just a temporary cyclical phenomenon. However,
it is the fact that the U.S. and Britain experienced significant increases in wage inequality since the 1970s/1980s,2
section of German workers from the negative demand shocks experienced by low-skilled workers
in the United States and Britain. My results are also supportive of recent discussions in Britain to
boost vocational education, which are in part influenced by the German apprenticeship system.
4
Surprisingly, there are not very many papers testing the claims of the Krugman hypothesis
and the existing evidence shows mixed results (Nickell and Bell 1995; 1996; Gottschalk and
Joyce 1998; Krueger and Pischke, 1997; Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux, 1999). In this paper, I
show that the assumption of the absence of supply shocks made in some of the previous literature
is not justified. Indeed, there were substantial changes in both the age and education structures of
the working age population as well as the labour force in all three countries I investigate. More
importantly, these changes clearly differed between the three countries. Therefore, I develop a
methodology that does not rely on the assumption of no supply shocks nor does it assume that
demand shocks can be proxied. My approach thus differs from and Krueger and Pischke (1997).
So do my results: Contrary to these authors (and contrary to Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux, 1999,
for France, Canada, and the U.S.), I find support for the Krugman hypothesis. Although being
conceptually related to Nickell and Bell (1995; 1996) and Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), my
methodology is not restricted to only two skill groups (‘high’ and ‘low’), but distinguishes
between the age and education dimensions. As to education, I show that by preserving national
specificities in the empirical analysis, an important difference arises between low-skilled
Germans with and those without apprenticeship training. The previous literature which has
attempted to harmonise educational categories across countries was not able to detect this
difference (cf. Blau and Kahn, 1996; Kahn, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003). This is not surprising given
that data from the OECD’s adult literacy survey (IALS) demonstrate that skill contents of
‘similar-sounding’ schooling types differ a lot between Germany and the U.S. (Freeman and
Schettkat, 2000). Pupil test scores reported for the U.S., Britain, Switzerland, and Germany
suggest the same (Nickell and Bell, 1996). For judging transatlantic differences in labour market
developments, it can therefore be counterproductive to attempt to harmonise diverse educational
systems, at least for the purposes of this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets used. Studies that
analyse a wider spectrum of countries often must compromise on data quality (cf. Blau and Kahn,
whereas Germany did not, which evoked institutional explanations for rising continental European unemployment
and made the Krugman hypothesis so widely accepted.
4 Reform proposals of the Tomlinson report are available on http://www.14-19reform.gov.uk/.3
1996; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998; Kahn, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003). The Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS), for example, contains micro data on many countries, but often only monthly wages
for household heads. Furthermore, one has at most 4 waves available for a two-decade period.
Hence it is impossible to trace the developments in the 1980s and 1990s in a robust fashion with
these data. Similar reservations apply to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data,
where in addition the sample size per country is rather small (about 1,000-2,000 observations).
Therefore, for each country investigated in this paper, I use at least one data set with 150,000
workers or more in the labour force (with Britain in the 1980s as the only exception). I also check
the sensitivity of my results using more than one data source for both Britain and western
Germany in the 1990s.
Differences in the changes of the labour supply structures between countries are
documented in Section 3 both in the age and the education dimensions. It is in the middle and in
the second half of the 1990s when German and Anglo-Saxon unemployment rates diverged.
Thus, although the major increase in U.S. and British wage inequality occurred in the 1980s and
early 1990s, any test of a hypothesis linking unemployment to the wage structure should also
consider what happened during the decade of the 1990s. This is done in Section 4, which presents
a ‘microeconometric’ test of the Krugman hypothesis in the form of statistical inference on
changes in the wage and unemployment as well as non-employment structures. Consistent with
the Krugman hypothesis, the results support the view that the rise in German unemployment was
accompanied by insufficiently flexible wages in face of negative demand shocks against the
unskilled. The affected groups are young workers and those with an education below
apprenticeship training. Whereas the U.S. has seen an almost continuous increase in between
education wage inequality, Britain has not in the 1990s. This difference can however largely be
explained by the massive supply changes effected by British educational policy. Section 5
concludes.
2D a t a
For the United States, I use the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group
(CPS-MORG) files. This is a representative and comfortably large data set frequently used in the
related literature. For Britain and western Germany, I use three different data sets. For Britain, the
(large) British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS)4
provide the desired information for the 1990s, but for the 1980s, I have to use the General
Household Survey (GHS), for reasons explained below. For Germany in the 1990s, I use the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the (large) German Labour Force Survey
(Mikrozensus, GLFS), and a (large) German administrative data set (IABR). Only the latter
survey is available since the beginning of the 1980s, when German unemployment increased
sharply.
The optimal data set for my purposes would (1) be representative for the whole population
of a country, (2) contain a definition of labour force states in accordance with the International
Labour Office (ILO) definition, (3) have accurate information on hourly wage rates, and (4)
contain enough observations to guarantee precise statistical measurement.
The U.S. CPS fulfills virtually all these criteria, although wages would be measured more
accurately with administrative data. There has been a recoding of the education variable in 1992,
which is treated as suggested by Jaeger (1997). Furthermore, I exclude all imputed earnings
whenever they are flagged. However, I checked that the inclusion or exclusion of the flagged
imputed wages made virtually no difference to my results (cf. Hirsch and Schumacher, 2002).
The British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) is similar to the CPS, but there is no wage
information before 1993 in the BLFS and until 1996, only a fifth of the interviewees were asked
their labour income. In 1997, this share increased to two fifths. As the BLFS is a quarterly
survey, I use all interviews of a calendar year to form an annual sample. As a result, some persons
are observed more than once in a calendar year (wherever applicable in the analysis below,
standard errors are corrected for clustering). The BHPS has a much smaller sample size than the
BLFS, but no clear advantages, except that it can be used as a robustness check. As the provided
education variable in the BHPS is coded slightly differently than in the BLFS, I recoded the
BHPS variable to make the two data sets better comparable. People on government schemes are
identifiable in each wave and are counted as out of the labour force. For the 1980s, I use the
General Household Survey (GHS), as the BLFS has no wage information during this period and
the BHPS has not existed yet. The definition of O-level and A-level equivalents is different in the
GHS from the BLFS, but these differences are not key to the results below. Due to the design of
the GHS, I use only full-time workers to measure changes in the structure of wages, but all
workers are used to estimate changes in un-/non-employment structures.5
For Germany, the data situation is also complicated (cf. Zimmermann and Wagner, 2002,
p. 113). The GSOEP fulfills all criteria except (4), large sample size, and (3) in the sense that it
does not contain administrative wage data. Although the ILO definition of the labour force state
is not implemented exactly in the GSOEP, non-workers are asked whether they ‘certainly want to
work again in the future’, and whether they could ‘start working immediately’. However, before
wave 1996, one does not know whether somebody is currently searching for work. The
administrative IABR data is strong on criteria (3) and (4) except that this data is top-coded,
excludes very low-wage workers, as well as civil servants. Also, hours of work are not reported,
only a full-time/part-time indicator. Moreover, this data set does not meet requirements (1) and
(2), as it is only sampling workers and people registered with the labour office who receive some
form of unemployment benefit. One does not know whether these persons are really searching
and are available for work in the short term, as required by the ILO definition of unemployment.
Nevertheless, for what it measures, the IABR has the most accurate wage data available for
Germany. As this data comes in spell form, I sample people on the 10
th of April each year. The
German Labour Force Survey (GLFS) meets criteria (1), (2), and (4), but fails on (3), as it only
measures after-tax (hourly) income within intervals. This income can come from any sources, not
just labour. Also, the top interval is open (implying top coding). Hence, as none of the German
data sets comes close to being optimal for my purposes, it is worthwhile to consider all three data
sets for Germany to check the robustness of the results for the 1990s. For the complete 1980s,
only the IABR data are available. If feasible, I create a gross hourly wage variable (including
overtime). This is possible in all countries and data sets except the IABR and the GLFS: in the
IABR, I only use full-time workers as hours of work are not available; in the GLFS, I create a net
hourly income variable for employed people as a proxy for the hourly wage. Wages of
apprentices are excluded in all German data sets for the wage regressions below. In all countries
and data sets, wages of self-employed workers are excluded in the analysis of wage structures,
but self-employed workers are counted as employed in the analysis of unemployment and non-
employment.
I measure skill in the age and education dimension. Age is discretised into 5 groups,
namely 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, and 56-65 years. Education is discretised into 4-6 groups
depending on the data set and country. In order to acknowledge diversity in the educational
systems between countries, I preserve the national education categories instead of allocating6
American labels to non-American degrees. This would be especially difficult in Germany, which
operates an apprenticeship system which has no direct equivalent in the U.S.
5
As some of the previous literature assumes the absence of relative supply shocks, Section
3 provides a descriptive analysis of supply structures before the empirical methodology is
developed in Section 4.
3 Differences in Supply Changes Across Countries
The graphs in Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate that, first, even within each decade, there were
substantial supply side changes within the analysed economies (the results presented in the
following are robust to the choice of the labour force instead of the working age population as the
proxy for supply). Second, these figures show that the supply side changes differed between the
three countries. This is true both in the age and in the education dimensions. The left panels in
Figure 2 and Figure 3 display the changes in the age distribution based on the largest and most
representative data set for each country (in the 1980s as available). Whereas all countries have
experienced changes in the age distribution, the sharp decline in the number of people between 16
and 25 years of age in the British (1990s only) but more so in the German working age
population (1980s and 1990s) is striking (the same holds for the labour force). This finding is
robust across the various data sets used for these countries. An equally important observation can
be made on changes in the educational structure in the right panels in Figure 2 and Figure 3. It is
shown in the graphs that, both in the 1980s and the 1990s, all countries have experienced skill
upgrading in their working age populations (the same holds for the labour forces). Indeed, all data
sets show an increase in the share of workers who have a degree as well as a decrease in the share
of workers with the lowest level of education. However, it is very clear just from visual
inspection of the graphs that these changes were most dramatic in Britain, caused by educational
5 Numbers of observations for each data set.and sample unemployment and non-employment rates for different skill
groups (using sampling weights as provided in the respective data sets) are available upon request. Although west
German unemployment in my sample was not massively higher (if at all) in 1997 than in Britain, the data confirm
the trends from the OECD data of Figure 1. Especially remarkable is how the vast difference in youth and low-
skilled unemployment between the Anglo-Saxon countries and Germany has shrunk during the 1990s. Yet the
data also confirm the point made by Nickell and Bell (1995; 1996) that the rise in continental European
unemployment also affected high-skilled workers. Most of these general trends are also supported by the non-
employment rate figures. An interesting difference, though, is the fact that the non-employment rate of prime-aged
workers and persons with a degree did not increase that much in Germany, but the unemployment rate did.
However, these raw changes in unemployment rates do not take changes in the composition of the labour force7
reforms (cf. Machin, 1996; 1998). The share of workers with no qualification in the working age
population (as well as in the labour force) decreased by about 10 percentage points in Britain
during the 1990s and by even more than 10 percentage points in the 1980s (slight differences
between the GHS and BLFS definitions of O-level equivalents account for small differences in
the absolute shares of those below O-level equivalent).
In the light of these results, the following section will apply a methodology to test the
Krugman hypothesis without making any assumptions on the nature of supply (or demand)
shocks.
4 Differences in the Changes of the Wage, Unemployment, and
Non-Employment Structures
4.1 Identification of Relative Net Demand Shocks and Relative Wage Rigidities
The methodology applied in this section identifies relative net demand shocks (i.e. ‘increasing’
and ‘decreasing’ labour markets) and wage rigidities. Conceptually, it draws on Nickell and Bell
(1996) and Gottschalk and Joyce (1997) in that it uses unemployment/non-employment as a
measure of quantity rationing (i.e. the failure of the market to clear) in the presence of wage
rigidities. However, unlike these previous studies, I consider several classes of skill in both the
age (as a proxy for experience) and education dimensions and control for these as well as other
labour market characteristics (gender, region) in a regression framework in both the wage and
unemployment models. As a sensitivity check, I also use non-employment (instead of
unemployment) as a measure for quantity rationing. The modelling approach does not exclude
that there is competition between heterogeneous types of labour.
Theoretical Justification – Net Demand Shocks
In order to make out increasing and decreasing labour markets, I develop a model that shows how
‘net demand shocks’ can be identified from the observation of wage and unemployment/non-
employment changes. The framework rests on a neoclassical model of the labour market:
into account, i.e. like the evidence in Nickell and Bell (1995; 1996), they do not provide ceteris paribus
comparisons. These ceteris paribus comparisons will be provided in Section 4 of this paper.8
St = St Wt,Ut () (L 1 vector of labour supplies)
Dt = Dt Wt,Ut () (L 1 vector of labour demands)
where t D and t S denote vectors of labour demand and supply for L different labour markets,
respectively. Wt is a vector of wage rates and Zt is a vector of demand and/or supply ‘shift
factors’, like the size of the labour force, technological change or domestic and foreign demand.
Unemployment or non-employment can arise due to a real wage rigidity that causes
quantity rationing (i.e. the failure of the market to clear). Unemployment due to rigid wages can
be expressed as a function of the vector of wage rates and supply/demand shift factors as
U t =
St  Dt ()
St
=1
Dt Wt,Zt ()
St Wt,Zt ()
=Ut Wt,Zt () (1)
(L 1 vector of latent unemployment rates).
In practice frictional unemployment may be higher for some groups than for others. In order to
net out this effect, it is useful to observe changes in unemployment and wages between two
points in time t (1980 or 1991 in this paper) and t+  (from 1981 to 1990 or from 1992 up to 2001
in this paper).
6 Using a Taylor expansion one obtains
t
t+ U
l  UW
l,l  t
t+ W
l
own wage effect
       
+ UW
l, j  t
t+ W
j
j l  
cross wage effects
          
+ UZ
l, j  t
t+ Z
j
j  
pure net supply shift effects
          
net supply shift effect  
l
                  
(2)
whereUW
l,l , UW
l, j ,a n dUZ
l, j are elements of the Jacobian derivative of U referring to the own
wage (the wage in the same labour market), the wages in other labour markets, and the
demand/supply shift factors, respectively.
Economic theory allows to impose a light restriction, which is helpful for identification in
the econometric analysis: if labour supply and demand schedules are ‘upward’ and ‘downward
sloping’, respectively, then UW
l,l will be positive, because a ceteris paribus increase of the own-
6 Data availability is the reason for a separate consideration of the 1980s and the 1990s. Data availability (for
Germany) is also the reason why 1991 and not 1990 is chosen as the base year for the 1990s. Below, I will also
discuss sensitivity checks with respect to the base year.9
wage will increase unemployment in the corresponding labour market. UW
l,l will also be positive
in other cases, one of them being ‘backward-bending’ labour supply behaviour in case the slope
of the demand curve is less steep than the one of the supply curve and there is no excess demand
for labour. It therefore seems innocuous to impose the restriction that UW
l,l is positive.
As to the sign of the cross-wage effectsUW
l, j , economic theory has little to say. This is also
true for the sign of the derivative of unemployment with respect to the supply/demand shift
variables, UZ
l, j , as these variables subsume a wide range of unspecified factors. Note that no
assumption is made on the size of substitution or any other demand or supply elasticities. These
weak assumptions come at the price of not being able to measure demand or supply shocks and
wage rigidity quantitatively. However, as can be deduced from equation (2), observation of the
signs of the changes in wage and unemployment rates between two points in time identify the
sign of the change in the net supply shift effect (i.e. the net supply shock)
 
l = UW
l, j  t
t+ W
j
j l  + UZ
l, j  t
t+ Z
j
j 
net supply shift effect
                  
in 7 out of 9 cases (distinguished by the sign of wage and unemployment changes, similarly as in
Table 1). Note that a negative net demand shock is equivalent to a positive net supply shock,
i.e.
l > 0 . A negative net demand shock implies a ‘decreasing’ market, that is, at a given wage,
demand is falling faster than supply.10
Relative Net Demand Shocks
However, the question posed by the Krugman (1994) hypothesis is not whether low-skilled
workers experienced a negative net demand shock, but whether they faced a relative negative net
demand shock. A relative negative net demand shock for a labour market l means that the net
demand shock experienced by this market is more negative than the one affecting the reference
market r (the latter refers to an ‘average’ market and is defined to be the 1980 or 1991 sample
mean of the labour force or of the working age population in this paper). Identification of relative
net demand (or supply) shocks is based on observing relative wage and unemployment changes:
t
t+W
l  t
t+W
r    and t
t+U
l  t
t+U
r    .
The identification of relative net demand shocks also requires an additional assumption,
namelyUW
l,l UW
r,r. Using a Taylor approximation as for the derivation of (2) one can write:
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.( 3 )
Imposing UW
l,l UW
r,r, which means that the own-wage effects on unemployment are
similar in labour market l and reference market r, yields:
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is the relative net supply shock.
Hence, by observing relative wage and unemployment changes, t
t+W
l  t
t+W
r and
t
t+U
l  t
t+U
r , and noting that equation (4) holds, even without knowledge of UW
l, l , the sign of
the relative net supply shock 
l,r (which is the negative of the relative net demand shock) can be
identified. 
l,r is the basis for the classification into ‘increasing’ (
l,r < 0) or ‘decreasing’11
(
l,r > 0) markets of labour market characteristics in Table 1 as will be shown in the following
subsection.
Empirical Implementation
In order to take the above concepts to individual data, I define a labour market l by its
characteristics xl (e.g. age, education, gender, region; the subscript l will be dropped hereafter),
and denote the reference labour market r by x (the 1980 or 1991 sample mean of the labour
force). W and U are defined as expected values of the wage rate w and the unemployment
indicatoru =1 unemployed () , respectively. 1 i () is the indicator function which takes on value 1 if
the argument is true and 0 otherwise. Hence I define
t
t+W
l  t
t+W
r      Ew t+  wt x     Ew t+  wt x    
t
t+U
l  t
t+U
r      Eu t+  ut x     Eu t+  ut x     .
In order to identify labour market characteristics associated with relative earnings or
unemployment changes, I parameterise the distributions of w and u in the following way:
El n w t x     = xt
Eu t x     =  x t ()
where  i ()denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. A
transformed version of the (dummy variable) coefficients of these non-linear parametric
regression models forms the basis for the classification of each labour market characteristic xk
(e.g. young age or low level of education) to its contribution to relative wage and unemployment
changes. This contribution is measured by the changes in the transformed (denoted by an asterisk)
coefficients over time: t+, k
*  t, k
* () and  t+, k
*  t, k
* () , respectively. The transformed coefficients
(as well as their standard errors) are calculated as in Haisken-De New and Schmidt (1997):
t
* = I  W () t ,  t
* = I  W ()  t ,w h e r eI is the identity matrix and W is a matrix containing
w e i g h t s ,w h i c hi nm yc a s ea r et h ebase period (1980 or 1991) sample means. This transformation
sets the ‘base category’ for all dummy variables equal to the base period sample mean. It can be
shown that due to the non-linearity of the log-linear wage regression and the probit model, this12
transformation is necessary to interpret changes in the coefficients over time as contributions to
rising relative wages or unemployment likelihoods. Hence, instead of classifying each
conceivable labour market defined by all dummy variable groups, one can just classify each
labour market characteristic xk into one of the nine cells defined in Table 1, depending on
whether it contributed to a rising, constant, or falling relative wage rate or unemployment
likelihood. This is the approach taken in the following subsection.
4.2 Empirical Results on Relative Net Demand Shocks and Relative Wage
Rigidities
In order to focus the discussion on the test of the Krugman hypothesis, Table 2 to Table 4 present
the classification results for the low-skilled groups of the age and education variables as defined
in Table 1. Table 2 reports results for the 1980s with 1980 as the base year, after which
unemployment rose sharply (cf. Figure 1). Results for the 1990s are displayed in Table 3 to
Table 4.
7 Around 5 different categories in both the age and education dimensions are
distinguished in the estimations, rather than only allowing for 2 skill types as in the previous
section and the studies by Nickell and Bell (1996) or Gottschalk and Joyce (1997). This is
important because the low-skilled group is not as homogeneous in Germany as it is in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, as more than half of the German population has received vocational training
(apprenticeship), whereas just 20 percent have obtained only ordinary school education. This
latter share is much higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries, at around 50 percent in the U.S. and
even higher in Britain in the 1990s (cf. Figure 3).
8
The classification results are based on two-sided t-tests with the null hypothesis that there were
no changes in the coefficients of the wage or the unemployment/non-employment equation for a
certain low-skill characteristic, e.g. age 16-25 years, between the base year (1980 or 1991) and
the reporting year mentioned at the top of each column. Sizes of 5 percent of these t-tests
correspond to a level of 10 percent (which is the upper bound of the true size, the lower bound
7 The choice of 1992 as the base year in the CPS is due to the definition change of the education categories between
1991 and 1992. In the following, I will also discuss results for 1991 and 1993 as the base year when considering
the age dimension of skill. The results are robust with respect to the choice of base year. The year 1993 is chosen
as base in the BLFS because there is no information on wages before this year.
8 Contrary to a myth that seems to exist, German workers with apprenticeship training must clearly be defined as
‘low’ rather than ‘high’ skilled (if such a simple distinction is to be made). This is demonstrated by the wage
regression results of Figure 4c and Figure 5c for the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, which show that this group
receives lower wages than workers with German high-school education.13
being 5 percent) of the Bonferroni joint test of the null hypothesis
ˆ t+,k
*  ˆ t,k
* () = ˆ  t+,k
*  ˆ  t,k
* () = 0. As I do not want the level of the joint test to exceed 10 percent,
I only consider 5 percent critical values for the t-statistics. This testing procedure allows for
correlations in the error terms of the wage and unemployment regressions without imposing
functional forms on their joint distribution.
Depending on the test results each skill characteristic is classified into one of the nine
fields as exhibited in Table 1 (tables and figures of detailed estimation results are presented in the
Internet Appendix; figures of estimated education coefficients in the wage and unemployment
regressions are displayed in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Classification results for the control variables
gender and region are not presented here, but are available on request. The type of classification
is reported as a number which is explained in the note to the tables and also corresponds to the
numbers in Table 1. If the Krugman (1994) hypothesis were to hold, one would expect that low-
skilled (young age, low education) categories in western Germany be classified as (1): ‘strongly
rigid’, (2): ‘weakly rigid in a decreasing market’, or, if wages were somewhat but not sufficiently
flexible, as (3): ‘weakly adjusting in a decreasing market’. In the U.S. and in Britain, one would
only expect relative wage adjustments, but no changes in relative quantity rationing (at least not
to the disadvantage of the unskilled). Hence, low-skilled characteristics for these countries should
be classified as (4): ‘strongly adjusting in a decreasing market’. Although there is evidence for
the Krugman hypothesis in the data, it turns out that the results are not as ‘clean’.
Testing the Krugman Hypothesis with Respect to the Age Dimension of Skill
The classification results for the young age groups are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 for the
1980s and 1990s, respectively (classifications for the other age groups are not displayed, but
available upon request). The low-skilled group here consists of workers between ages 16 and 25
(as they hardly have any work experience). With respect to young workers, there is no support for
the Krugman hypothesis in the 1980s: In none of the three countries were wages consistently
rigid for young workers (cf. Table 2). This result is robust to choosing either 1981 or 1982 instead
of 1980 as the base year for the displayed classifications (available upon request). In Germany,
the result is also robust with respect to choosing 1984 as the base year. This check is important,
because of a change in the registration of wages between 1983 and 1984 in the German IABR14
data: Since 1984, companies have to include fringe benefits when reporting wages (Steiner and
Wagner, 1998).
In the 1990s, there is only weak support for the Krugman hypothesis with respect to
young workers (cf. Table 3): The evidence for the U.S. surprisingly suggests a strong relative
wage rigidity (classification (1))
9. Wages for British young workers seem to have reacted to
negative net demand shocks, as the prevailing classifications (3): ‘weakly adjusting in a
decreasing market’ and (4): ‘strongly adjusting in a decreasing market’ for this group indicate.
Especially the larger BLFS data set suggests that the unemployment likelihood of the young fell
by less than the one of the other age groups (which is apparent from classification (3) and the fact
that British unemployment fell on average). This at least suggests that – in spite of relative wage
losses – the British wage structure is somewhat less flexible for younger workers than for other
groups. For Germany, on the other hand, classifications (3): ‘weakly adjusting in a decreasing
market’ and (1): ‘strongly rigid’ dominate, which shows that increasing relative youth
unemployment in this country is related to insufficiently flexible wages. If one checks the
robustness of these results by using non-employment instead of unemployment as the measure for
quantity rationing, more support for the Krugman hypothesis emerges for the 1990s (cf. Table 3):
The U.S. evidence suggests no rigidity, the preferred British data set, the BLFS, classifies young
workers mostly into the ‘flexible’ class (4), whereas class (3) dominates in the large German
GLFS data set.
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Testing the Krugman Hypothesis with Respect to the Education Dimension of Skill
Having found only some weak support for the Krugman (1994) hypothesis in terms of the wage
and unemployment/non-employment structures with respect to young age in the 1990s, the
9 However, the results for the U.S. are somewhat more erratic when 1991 or 1993 are chosen as base year, where the
‘flexible’ classifications (4) and (6) appear as well. Still, in these cases, the classification (1) also appears during
the years 1996/97 to 2000, but not in 2001.
10 Choosing 1992 or 1993 as the base year in the BHPS data reveals no classification (3) in any year (only 4) for
neither the unemployment nor the non-employment measures for quantity rationing. Hence, there is no further
indication of relative wage rigidity in Britain from this robustness check. For western Germany, however, the
finding of relative wage rigidity in the GSOEP data with unemployment as the measure for quantitiy rationing is
robust to the choice of 1992 (but not 1993) as the base period. The same holds for the GLFS data set, where
classifications (1) and (2) occurr in both the models with unemployment and non-employment when 1993 is
chosen as the base year (note that there is no GLFS survey available for 1992). In the IABR data, there is also
some indication for relative wage rigidity if 1992 (but not if 1993) is chosen as the base period. Hence, choosing
alternative base periods does not change the main conclusion that western Germany exhibits relative rigidity for
young workers’ wages. Although GSOEP and IABR data might suggest that the rigidity originated between 1991
and 1993, the GLFS data suggest further increases in rigidity even after 1993.15
question arises whether the educational wage and unemployment/non-employment structures
behaved in a similar way. I will show that with respect to education, there is more evidence for
the claim of the Krugman hypothesis that rigid wages for the low-skilled may cause German
unemployment. This is true both in the 1980s and in the 1990s, although the developments are
more distinct between Germany and the United States in the 1990s. Moreover, the hypothesis
only holds for the lowest education groups. In addition, in Britain, supply effects neutralised
relative demand changes in the 1990s, which is not taken into account in the simple statement of
the hypothesis.
Table 2 and Table 4 present classification results for the education coefficients in the three
countries for the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. I report only the two lowest education groups in
each country, which are high school and high school dropouts in the U.S., O-level equivalent and
below O-level equivalent in Britain, and apprenticeship and below apprenticeship in western
Germany. For the lowest education groups in these countries, there is a clear contrast between the
Anglo-Saxon economies on the one hand, and western Germany on the other: The large data sets
in Germany predominantly display classifications (1): ‘strongly rigid’ (GLFS data) and (3):
‘weakly adjusting in a decreasing market’ (IABR data): results here are similar for the 1980s and
the 1990s.
11 In the U.S., by contrast, only the ‘flexible’ classifications (4): ‘strongly adjusting in a
decreasing market’ and (9): ‘converging’ are observed in the 1990s (classification (4) also
dominates during the end of the 1980s). In Britain, the least skilled group seems not to have
experienced a negative relative net demand shock in the 1990s as it did in the 1980s (in the 1980s
there are much fewer ‘rigid’ classifications (3) for the British than the German low skilled).
However, as discussed in Section 3, there was a massive decrease in the relative supply of the
least educated group in Britain in the 1990s (cf. Figure 3), which must have netted out a relative
‘gross’ demand shock against this group. Hence, although the differences between western
Germany and the United States are striking and consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, the
British evidence points to the potential importance of supply side effects, which clearly differed
between countries as shown in Section 3.
12
11 The point estimates of the small GSOEP data set also suggest rising relative unemployment for the least skilled
and falling relative wages, but especially the former are mostly not significant as the classifications in Table 4
show.
12 In the 1980s, choosing 1981 or 1982 instead of 1980 as the base year leads to similar results: The contrast between
the Anglo-Saxon economies and Germany becomes even stronger, as the rigid classification (3) vanishes almost
completely in these robustness checks for the United States and Britain, but not for western Germany. The16
Considering the second lowest skill groups, there is no consistent picture supporting the
Krugman hypothesis: In the U.S., classifications (4): ‘strongly adjusting in a decreasing market’
and (9): ‘converging’ alternate for high school graduates in the 1990s and classification (4)
predominates in the 1980s. The evidence from the large British BLFS data set, however, suggests
insufficiently flexible relative wages in terms of classification (3): ‘weakly adjusting in a
decreasing market’ for the 1990s (nothing much happened in the 1980s). In western Germany, the
evidence for the 1990s is not robust, with the GLFS exhibiting relative wage rigidity in the form
of classification (2): ‘weakly rigid in a decreasing market’ but the IABR and GSOEP data
suggesting otherwise (where classifications (6): ‘strongly adjusting in an increasing market’ and
(7): ‘weakly adjusting in an increasing market’ prevail). The 1980s evidence supports the view
that workers with apprenticeship training were not affected by relative wage rigidities in western
Germany: over the decade as a whole, they experienced a positive instead of a negative net
demand shock (classification (7)).
I fIu s enon-employment as the measure for quantity rationing (cf. the lowest panel of
Table 2 for the 1980s and the lower panel of Table 4 for the 1990s), the results for the 1990s are
very similar to those obtained for unemployment as the measure for quantity rationing, except that
in the British BLFS the lowest instead of the second lowest skill group displays relative wage
rigidity. For the 1980s, however, the Krugman hypothesis breaks down if non-employment is
used as the measure for quantity rationing, because wages for the lowest skill groups are now
indicated to be rigid in the sense of classification (3), ‘weakly adjusting’, in both Britain and the
United States (for Germany, the only data set available for the complete 1980s is the IABR,
which does not allow to measure non-employment as opposed to unemployment).
13
German results are also robust to choosing 1984 as base year (this check is warranted by the inclusion of fringe
benefits in wage measurement in the IABR since 1984, cf. Steiner and Wagner, 1998).
In the 1990s, the classification results for western Germany are robust to the choice of 1992 or 1993 as the base
period in all three data sets and in both the models with unemployment and non-employment as the measure for
quantity rationing (there are only minor deviations which do not alter the interpretation of the results). The same
holds for the British BHPS data with 1992 or 1993 as the base, as well as the U.S. results if 1993 is chosen as the
base period.
13 As in the case of the lowest education groups, the classification results for the second-lowest education groups are
robust to the choice of alternative base years. For the 1980s, there is no change to the main results if 1981 or 1982
instead of 1980 is chosen as base year. The German results are also robust to choosing 1984 as base year (this
check is warranted by the inclusion of fringe benefits in wage measurement in the IABR since 1984, cf. Steiner
and Wagner, 1998).
For the 1990s, the classification results for the second-lowest education groups are robust to the choice of 1992 or
1993 as base period in all three German data sets; and in the British BLFS in both the models with unemployment
and non-employment as the measure for quantity rationing. The U.S. results are also robust when 1993 is chosen17
The Importance of Apprenticeship Training in Germany and Supply Changes in Britain
The differences in the results for the two lowest education categories substantiate the value of
considering various dimensions of skill as well as more detailed national education
characteristics. Unlike previous studies like Nickell and Bell (1996) and Gottschalk and Joyce
(1998), I show that distinguishing between additional than just high- and low-skilled groups
reveals more sophisticated results: Indeed, both in the 1980s and the 1990s, evidence for
Krugman’s hypothesis can only be found for the least skilled education groups, but not for
German workers with an apprenticeship certificate. The relative supply of apprenticeship
certificate holders has not fallen at all in western Germany in the 1980s and not fallen by much
during the 1990s (cf. Figure 2c and Figure 3c). Taken together, this evidence is consistent with a
point made by Nickell and Bell (1996) and Freeman and Schettkat (2000), namely that a large
part of the ‘low-skilled’ in Germany may have a higher level of human capital than their peers in
the Anglo-Saxon countries due to the training they receive through the German apprenticeship
system. Indeed, the evidence presented here raises doubts on whether workers who have gone
through Germany’s apprenticeship system experienced the same relative negative demand shocks
as American high school graduates. Previous studies have lumped several low-skilled groups
together and therefore blurred this interesting finding: A German-style apprenticeship education
seems to convey skills that are of a rather different quality than the American high school (which
provides classroom, but no vocational training). Consequently, the major low-skilled groups in
the U.S. and Germany do not seem to have experienced the same relative negative demand
shocks. However, what supports the view that negative relative demand shocks against the
unskilled have been experienced across the industrialised world is that German workers with an
educational level below apprenticeship have been affected by such shocks both in the 1980s and
in the 1990s. Although my classification results identify only relative net demand shocks for the
least skilled in western Germany, the fact that the supply of this group in terms of the working
age population (and of the labour force) fell (cf. Figure 2c and Figure 3c) leads to the conclusion
that the negative relative net demand shock has been generated by a negative relative ‘gross’
supply shock and an even more negative relative ‘gross’ demand shock.
Apart from relying on the classification results based on statistical inference, a look at the
point estimates presented graphically in Figure 4 and Figure 5 helps to illustrate the different
as the base period (note that 1991 is not a useful choice due to the definition change of the education variable
between 1991 and 1992; cf. Section 2).18
experiences of the three countries. The U.S. educational wage structure displayed in Figure 4a
and Figure 5a shows how educational wage inequality increased fairly smoothly throughout the
two decades (there might be short pauses in this trend in the late-1980s and the mid-1990s). By
contrast, both the educational unemployment (and non-employment) structures became more
equal since the mid-1980s. The most striking support for Krugman’s hypothesis is revealed by a
comparison of the changes in western Germany’s unemployment structure with the one of the
U.S. in the 1990s (cf. Figure 5a and Figure 5c). The German unemployment structure has become
more unequal, whereas the one in the U.S. has become more equal. This is exactly what the
Krugman hypothesis states. The least educated in western Germany have also faced an increase in
their non-employment likelihood in this period, which is not the case for the least skilled in the
U.S., who have experienced a decrease (results are available upon request). However, albeit
insufficiently flexible, the west German wage structure has not been completely rigid according
to the administrative IABR data set (cf. Figure 5c for the 1990s and Figure 4c for the 1980s).
What about Britain? Figure 5b shows that, compared to the U.S. experience, the British
educational wage structure was fairly stable during the 1990s, although the developments were
similar in both countries in the 1980s (cf. Figure 4a/b). The educational unemployment structure
did not become much more unequal in neither the 1980s nor the 1990s (cf. Figure 4b and
Figure 5b), which contrasts with the German experience, especially when the least skilled are
considered in the 1990s. What is interesting about comparing Britain and Germany in the 1980s
is that despite large increases in the aggregate unemployment rate in both countries in the early
1980s with a subsequent decrease in the late 1980s (cf. Figure 1), in Britain, these shocks were
not accompanied by large swings in the structure of unemployment as they were in Germany.
This is further support for the view that unemployment in Germany is more related to the failure
of relative wages between skill groups to clear the markets, so that we observe changes in relative
quantity rationing. This illustrates the rigidity of the relative wage structure in Germany. For
Britain, the broad picture that a stable wage structure could be sustained in the 1990s, without
relative unemployment increases for the least educated as in western Germany, can be explained
by the substantial relative supply changes as discussed in Section 3.19
Are There Alternative Explanations?
Sample Selection
Although the evidence presented here (especially when western Germany and the U.S. are
compared) is broadly consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, especially in the 1990s, one may
raise alternative explanations for these regression results. One argument could be based on the
issue of sample selection in wage regressions (Heckman, 1979; Leung and Yu, 1996): In the face
of relative demand shocks against the unskilled, one expects workers with the least unobserved
skills to lose their jobs first. Hence, standard wage regressions as presented here might falsely
conclude that the wage structure between observed skill categories has remained stable, whereas
in fact the price of skills (taking into account observed and unobserved factors) has fallen. At the
same time, one would measure an increase in the relative unemployment and non-employment of
the least skilled workers, as they either leave the labour force or prefer to draw unemployment
benefits instead of working for a lower wage. However, if this explanation is claimed to be the
only factor underlying my results, then one would expect an increase in the relative
unemployment or relative non-employment for the low skilled not only in western Germany, but
also in the U.S. Yet, this did not happen to low education groups in the U.S. in the 1990s (it did
in the 1980s, cf. Table 2 and Table 4) Therefore, the ‘sample selection interpretation’ cannot be
the main factor driving the empirical observations of this paper for the 1990s.
Changes in Search Intensity
Another alternative explanation could be that changes in the search intensities of low-skilled
workers drive differences across countries in the changes in the relative unemployment and non-
employment likelihoods. If this were the case, the Krugman hypothesis would not be the correct
interpretation of the results presented here. In the 1990s, major reforms of the unemployment
benefit and welfare systems in the Unites States and in Britain with their emphasis on mandatory
job search assistance and the introduction of work requirements were, with the exception of the
British New Deal of 1998, not explicitly targeted at young or less educated workers (cf. Monthly
Labor Review, various issues; Blank and Haskins, 2001; and Weil, 2002; for the U.S.; Van
Reenen, 2001; for Britain). However, the U.S. profiling system for unemployment insurance
introduced since 1993 and significant welfare reform triggered by the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 can be expected to have taken effect mostly on20
these socio-economic groups (Blank, 2002). The same holds in Britain for the introduction of the
Job Seekers’ Allowance in 1996 and the New Deal of 1998. However, also in Germany, welfare
eligibility was made more stringent and work incentives were increased through the Welfare
Reform Act of 1996. Moreover, there were no significant changes in the unemployment benefit
regime in Germany during the 1990s that could explain the increased relative unemployment of
the young and the low skilled.
14 Furthermore, the time pattern of relative unemployment and non-
employment changes for young people in western Germany either suggests a rather smooth
increase in relative unemployment of this group, or an increase which is mainly concentrated in
the period 1991-1993 (cf. footnote 10). Hence, even if benefits became harder to collect over time
in the U.S. thus potentially explaining the convergence in the U.S. unemployment structure, the
smooth changes in the German unemployment structure in the 1990s cannot have been caused by
changes in the German unemployment benefit or welfare regime.
In the early 1980s, changes in German regulations made unemployment benefit receipt
more stringent, but still relative unemployment of the low-skilled increased. Since 1984, the
system became more generous again, especially for older workers (Steffen, 2002). Therefore, the
steady upward trend in relative unemployment for the least skilled in Germany is not consistent
with the timing of changes in unemployment benefit regulations in the 1980s. Similarly, the
timing of major changes in unemployment benefit policy in the United States and Britain in the
1980s does not concur with the development of the relative unemployment structures in Figure 4.
The relative unemployment likelihood of the least skilled in Britatin remained rather constant
overall and even increased despite the introduction of the Restart program in 1987 (cf. Dolton and
O’Neill, 2002). Also in the United States, the development of the unemployment structure is
rather smooth, despite the large drop in benefit take-up rates in the early 1980s (cf. Blank and
Card, 1991; Vroman, 1998). Nevertheless the tightening of eligibility rules since the mid 1980s
by many states may have contributed to the decline in relative unemployment of the least skilled
(cf. Monthly Labor Review, various issues).
14 The only potential exception are increases in the minimum age for certain prolonged entitlement periods for
unemployment benefits in 1997. These affected workers above 42 years of age. However, these changes, which
for any given age group only altered the entitlement period by 2 months (e.g. f r o m1 4t o1 2m o n t h sf o r4 2y e a r
olds), were rather minor. A summary of social policy changes in Germany since the 1970s is provided in German
in Steffen (2002).21
Business Cycles
A third critique of the interpretation of the results might argue that the three countries are
observed at different stages of their business cycles and that changes in wage and unemployment
structures are mere reflections of movements within different stages of the business cycle. This
argument also does not stand up to scrutiny: Although there are some movements in the wage and
unemployment/non-employment structures, visual inspection of these movements in Figure 4 and
Figure 5 provides no support that the movement towards more equality in the unemployment
structure of the United States is a mere cyclical phenomenon. Instead, it seems to be a trend-like
movement from the early 1980s onwards; two decades being a much longer period than the
average cycle (cf. Stock and Watson, 1999). Similarly, no cyclical movements can be detected for
Britain. In Germany, the increase in relative unemployment of the least skilled has also been a
trend-like process in the 1990s and to some extent even in the 1980s, although in the 1980s the
sharp increase in unemployment inequality between educational groups had been concurrent with
the decreasing growth rates in the early 80s. Similarly, unemployment inequality decreased
during the boom in 1989/1990. Nevertheless, even in the 1980s, the relative unemployment
incidence of the least skilled in Germany moved almost monotonically upward and never reached
the low level of the early 1980s again. Hence, the continuing deterioration in the relative
unemployment position of the least skilled in Germany seems to be a systematic problem of the
last two decades. A further argument against the business cycle interpretation of my results is
provided by the fact that robustness checks on the classifications (statistical tests) as discussed in
the footnotes above give credence to the view that the reported main results are not sensitive to
varying the base period between the years 1980 and 1982 as well as 1991 and 1993.
Efficiency Wages
A fourth argument could be that efficiency wages rather than institutions (as claimed by the
Krugman hypothesis) are responsible for wage rigidities. Efficiency wages seem to be a
particularly unconvincing explanation for least-skilled unemployment. One reason is that the least
skilled may be a cheap group to monitor as they mostly do routine tasks which may be easier to
evaluate than more diversified tasks of qualified workers (cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992,
Chapter 12). As monitoring costs are a major ingredient to the efficiency wage hypothesis
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), this raises doubt about efficiency wages explaing the rise in relative22
unemployment for workers without apprenticeship in western Germany. More importantly, the
efficiency wage hypothesis cannot explain why experiences should differ as they do between the
investigated countries.
In sum, the microeconometric investigation of changes in wage, unemployment, and non-
employment structures with respect to age and education has found some support for the
Krugman hypothesis both in the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s. This is especially true
when comparing western Germany with the United States.
5 Conclusions
Although it seems a consensus view among economists that rising European unemployment and
rising inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries are ‘two sides of the same coin’, namely a secular
fall in the relative demand for the low skilled (‘Krugman hypothesis’), there are only few
empirical studies testing this hypothesis with individual data. This paper tests the Krugman
hypothesis for the 1980s and the 1990s. It is first shown that the assumption of no relative supply
shocks made in some of the previous literature is unjustified. Subsequently, a methodology is
applied which is agnostic about the nature of demand and supply shocks in its testing procedure.
The approach developed in this paper also allows a more sophisticated distinction between
different types of low-skilled workers than the previous literature. This turns out to be important,
especially when distinguishing between Germans with and without apprenticeship training.
Comparing the U.S. with western Germany renders support for the view that wage
rigidities influenced unemployment (and non-employment) developments in Germany: Tests on
changes in the wage, unemployment, and non-employment structures with respect to age and
education reveal that the lack of sufficient wage flexibility impinged on young and least educated
German workers in terms of higher relative unemployment risk. However, there is tentative
evidence that persons with a German apprenticeship certificate were not affected by a negative
relative (net) demand shock. This suggests that the German vocational education system provides
many workers with skills shielding them from both relative wage and relative employment losses.
By contrast, the relative wage position of American high-school graduates deteriorated.
On the other hand, the evidence on Britain demonstrates the importance of relative supply
effects that helped to keep the educational wage structure constant in the 1990s.23
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Table 1: Relative Wage and Unemployment/Non-Employment Behaviour and Labour
Market Classification
Contributing to a
relative unemployment
decrease
 t+, k
*  t, k
* () < 0
Contributing to a
constant relative
unemployment
 t+, k
*  t, k
* () = 0
Contributing to a
relative unemployment
increase
 t+, k
*  t, k
* () > 0
Contributing to a
relative wage increase
t+, k
*  t, k
* () > 0
(7): 
l,r < 0
weakly adjusting in
increasing market relative
to the reference market
(6): 
l,r < 0
strongly adjusting in
increasing market relative
to the reference market
(1): 
l,r = ?
strongly rigid
(wage push) relative to
the reference market
Contributing to a
constant relative wage
t+, k
*  t, k
* () = 0
(8): 
l,r < 0
weakly rigid in increasing
market relative to the
reference market
(5): 0  =
stable in stable market
relative to the reference
market
(2): 
l,r > 0
weakly rigid in decreasing
market relative to the
reference market
Contributing to a
relative wage decrease
t+, k
*  t, k
* () < 0
(9): 
l,r = ?
converging
(wage pull) relative to the
reference market
(4): 
l,r > 0
strongly adjusting in
decreasing market
relative to the reference
market
(3): 
l,r > 0
weakly adjusting in
decreasing market
relative to the reference
market
Note: The terminology ‘increasing market’ refers to a positive relative net demand shock (which is the same as a negative relative
net supply shock 
l,r < 0 for labour market l with respect to the reference market r as defined in Section 4). Increasing markets
relative to the reference market are identified in cases (6), (7), and (8). Analogously, a ‘decreasing market’ is equivalent to a
negative net demand shock. Decreasing markets relative to the reference market are identified in cases (2), (3), and (4). In cases
(1) and (9), the sign of the net demand shock cannot be identified,
l,r = ?. In case (5), there is no such shock. See also the
theoretical discussion in Section 4.27
Table 2: Classification Summary for the 1980s (Codes 1, 2 and 3 Indicate Rigidity)
Variable 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Young Age – with Unemployment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1980)
16-25 499999 9999
Britain (GHS; Base 1980)
16-25 -42444 9944
Germany (IABR; Base 1980)
16-25 4-3 669 9999
Young Age – with Non-employment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1980)
16-25 334449 9944
Britain (GHS; Base 1980)
16-25 2 3234 4 4944
Low Level of Education– with Unemployment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1980)
High School - 23444 4444
High School Dropout 4 33333 4444
Britain (GHS; Base 1980)
O-level equivalent -----8 --8 6
Below O-level equivalent 2-443 3 443 4
Germany (IABR; Base 1980)
Apprenticeship --4444 7777
Below Apprenticeship 223333 3333
Low Level of Education– with Non-employment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1980)
High School -22434 4444
High School Dropout 333333 3333
Britain (GHS; Base 1980)
O-level equivalent 8--8-8 8877
Below O-level equivalent 223333 3333
Note: The classifications are based on regression results controlling for age, education, gender, region, as well as the month of
interview in the CPS and the GHS.
The classification codes are as follows (cf. Table 1): (1): strongly rigid (rising relative wage and rising relative unemployment);
(2): weakly rigid in a decreasing market (constant relative wage and rising relative unemployment); (3): weakly adjusting in a
decreasing market (falling relative wage and rising relative unemployment); (4): strongly adjusting in a decreasing market (falling
relative wage and constant relative unemployment); (- = 5): stable in a stable market (constant relative wage and constant relative
unemployment); (6): strongly adjusting in an increasing market (rising relative wage and constant relative unemployment); (7):
weakly adjusting in an increasing market (rising relative wage and falling relative unemployment); (8): weakly rigid in an
increasing market (constant relative wage and falling relative unemployment); (9): converging (falling relative wage and falling
relative unemployment).
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household Survey (GHS); German
Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations.28
Table 3: Young Age Classification Summary for the 1990s (Codes 1, 2 and 3 Indicate
Rigidity)
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
With Unemployment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
16-25 --211 1111
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
16-25 4443 333
Britain (BHPS)
16-25 4444 3 4 3
Germany (GSOEP)
16-25 --2 - 2 4 333
Germany (GLFS)
16-25 23 3 3 3
Germany (IABR)
16-25 111113
With Non-employment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
16-25 --866 6666
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
16-25 4444 443
Britain (BHPS)
16-25 22- 233 4--
Germany (GSOEP)
16-25 --2--4 444
Germany (GLFS)
16-25 - 333 3
Germany (IABR)
No Data
Note: The classifications are based on regression results controlling for age, education, gender, region, as well as the month of
interview in the CPS and the BLFS.
The classification codes are as follows (cf. Table 1): (1): strongly rigid (rising relative wage and rising relative non-employment);
(2): weakly rigid in a decreasing market (constant relative wage and rising relative non-employment); (3): weakly adjusting in a
decreasing market (falling relative wage and rising relative non-employment); (4): strongly adjusting in a decreasing market
(falling relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (- = 5): stable in a stable market (constant relative wage and
constant relative non-employment); (6): strongly adjusting in an increasing market (rising relative wage and constant relative non-
employment); (7): weakly adjusting in an increasing market (rising relative wage and falling relative non-employment); (8):
weakly rigid in an increasing market (constant relative wage and falling relative non-employment); (9): converging (falling
relative wage and falling relative non-employment).
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own
calculations.29
Table 4: Low Level of Education Classification Summary for the 1990s (Codes 1, 2 and 3
Indicate Rigidity)
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
With Unemployment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
High School ---44 4949
High School Dropout -4444 4999
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
O-level equivalent ---- 4 33
Below O-level equivalent ---- ---
Britain (BHPS)
O-level equivalent ------ ---
Below O-level equivalent ------ ---
Germany (GSOEP)
Apprenticeship 22266- 666
Below Apprenticeship -4-44- --4
Germany (GLFS)
Apprenticeship 32 2 2 3
Below Apprenticeship -6 1 1 1
Germany (IABR)
Apprenticeship 666677
Below Apprenticeship 4 33333
With Non-employment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
High School ---44 4444
High School Dropout -4444 9999
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
O-level equivalent ---5 944
Below O-level equivalent 2 - 2 2 222
Britain (BHPS)
O-level equivalent ------ ---
Below O-level equivalent ---8-- ---
Germany (GSOEP)
Apprenticeship ---66- 666
Below Apprenticeship -4-44- --4
Germany (GLFS)
Apprenticeship 33 3 3 3
Below Apprenticeship 8 111 6
Germany (IABR)
No Data
Note: The classifications are based on regression results controlling for age, education, gender, region, as well as the month of
interview in the CPS and the BLFS. The classification codes are as follows (cf. Table 1): (1): strongly rigid (rising relative wage
and rising relative non-employment); (2): weakly rigid in a decreasing market (constant relative wage and rising relative non-
employment); (3): weakly adjusting in a decreasing market (falling relative wage and rising relative non-employment); (4):
strongly adjusting in a decreasing market (falling relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (- = 5): stable in a stable
market (constant relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (6): strongly adjusting in an increasing market (rising
relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (7): weakly adjusting in an increasing market (rising relative wage and
falling relative non-employment); (8): weakly rigid in an increasing market (constant relative wage and falling relative non-
employment); (9): converging (falling relative wage and falling relative non-employment).
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own
calculations.30
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates 1960 - 2000
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Note: The U.S. unemployment rate is base on the CPS, which uses a definition of unemployment equivalent to the ILO definition.
For Western Germany, OECD figures only provide the registered unemployment rate for a longer time period. Comparing the
registered with the OECD standardized unemployment rate for united Germany suggests about a 1.5 percent difference between
the two, so that the standardised unemployment rate for western Germany would also be lower than depicted in the graph. For the
UK, however, the standardised unemployment rate is about 1 percentage point higher than the registered one shown in the graph.
It is, however, not available for such a long time period.
Source:O E C D .31
Figure 2a: Age and Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1980s - U.S.
(CPS)
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Figure 2b: Age and Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1980s - Britain
(GHS)
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Figure 2c: Age and Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1980s -
Germany (IABR)
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Note: Between 1991 and 1992 the coding of the education variable changed in the CPS, which explains changes in the shares of
especially high school graduates and high school dropouts between those years. I therefore use 1992 as the base year for the
reported classifications.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household Survey (GHS); German
Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR).32
Figure 3a: Age and Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1990s - U.S.
(CPS)
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Figure 3b: Age and Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1990s - Britain
(BLFS)
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Figure 3c: Age and Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1990s -
Germany (GLFS)
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Note: Between 1991 and 1992 the coding of the education variable changed in the CPS, which explains changes in the shares of
especially high school graduates and high school dropouts between those years. I therefore use 1992 as the base year for the
reported classifications.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); own calculations.33
Figure 4a: U.S. Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1980s -
(CPS)
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Figure 4b: British Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1980s -
(GHS)
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Figure 4c: German Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1980s
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Note: The left and right panels exhibit the transformed wage and unemployment regression coefficients 
t , k
*
and 
t , k
*
, respectively.
The jump in the relative wages of workers with a degree in the IABR data is explained by a statistical phenomenon: Since 1984,
companies have to include fringe benefits when reporting wages for this data set (Steiner and Wagner, 1998). In the paper’s text
and footnotes, I therefore report sensitivity checks with respect to the choice of the base period for the classifications. It turns out
that the change in measurement does not affect the classification results for low-skilled workers in the sense that classification
results are essentially the same no matter whether 1980, 1981, 1982 or 1984 is chosen as base year.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household Survey (GHS); German
Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR).34
Figure 5a: U.S. Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1990s -
(CPS)
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Figure 5b: British Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1990s -
(BLFS)
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Figure 5c: German Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1990s
- (Wages: IABR; Unemployment: GLFS)
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Year
Degree
High School and Apprenticeship
High School (Abitur)
Apprenticeship
Below Apprenticeship
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Higher
Higher Vocational - Meister
High School
Apprenticeship
Below Apprenticeship
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Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); own calculations.Internet Appendix
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This Appendix includes only tables for the 1990s in order to demonstrate the
regression results underlying the classifications reported in the paper.
The results for the 1980s are made available on request1
Table A1: Numbers of Observations
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS)
Wage Regression 166,640 164,571 161,685 147,040 134,019 105,589 107,365 106,798 103,098 101,048 105,440
Unempl. Regression 214,970 212,232 208,411 202,498 200,246 177,983 180,462 181,377 182,691 183,530 196,172
Non-Empl.
Regression
283,576 278,606 274,198 266,401 263,147 232,780 235,372 235,549 237,754 238,950 255,548
Britain (BLFS)
Wage Regression 33,441 33,924 35,809 35,485 63,367 69,952 67,058 64,366
Unempl. Regression 283,381 279,782 282,896 274,108 260,728 262,232 258,136 253,360
Non-Empl.
Regression
362,679 357,707 362,278 350,368 332,907 334,519 327,482 321,094
Britain (BHPS)
Wage Regression 4,355 4,085 3,922 3,971 3,975 4,132 4,254 4,230 4,140 3,974
Unempl. Regression 6,184 5,714 5,458 5,455 5,296 5,506 5,520 5,408 5,309 5,076
Non-Empl.
Regression
8,056 7,598 7,269 7,225 7,036 7,314 7,289 7,005 6,866 6,553
Germany (GSOEP)
Wage Regression 3,969 3,852 3,877 3,747 4,007 3,898 3,789 3,949 4,100 7,258
Unempl. Regression 5,527 5,360 5,378 5,119 5,423 5,311 5,159 5,588 5,560 10,156
Non-Empl.
Regression
7,567 7,462 7,393 7,215 7,633 7,335 7,126 7,723 7,559 14,013
Germany (GLFS)
Wage Regression 134,115 131,774 135,266 132,696 133,106 132,930
Unempl. Regression 169,287 169,734 176,098 171,260 174,199 170,346
Non-Empl.
Regression 238,321 235,371 244,291 239,708 242,307 234,421
Germany (IABR)
Wage Regression 156,049 157,493 154,606 148,811 147,495 143,780 140,906
Unempl. Regression 205,424 209,560 210,288 207,097 205,829 203,028 200,607
Note: Changes between 1995 and 1996 in the CPS are explained by the changes in the imputation flags (cf.H i r s c ha n d
Schumacher, 2002). The large increase in the number of wage observations in the BLFS between 1996 and 1997 is explained by
the fact that respondents were asked about their wage only in the 1
st quarter of interview up to 1996, but also in the 5
th quarter
since 1997. Columns with no entry signify that no data are available (to me) for these years.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own
calculations.2
Table A2: Unemployment Rates by Age
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS)
Whole sample 6.8 7.5 7.0 6.1 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.9 4.6
16-25 12.6 13.3 12.8 11.6 11.3 11.1 10.6 9.9 9.1 8.6 9.6
26-35 6.7 7.3 6.7 5.7 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.7 3.3 4.3
36-45 4.9 5.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.5
46-55 4.6 5.3 5.1 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.9
56-65 4.0 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.4 3.1
Britain (BLFS)
Whole sample 10.4 9.6 8.7 8.1 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.5
16-25 17.9 16.6 15.4 15.0 13.7 13.0 12.3 11.9
26-35 10.0 9.2 8.4 7.9 6.5 5.9 5.6 4.8
36-45 7.6 7.0 6.7 6.2 5.0 4.4 4.4 3.9
46-55 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 4.0 3.6
56-65 9.2 8.6 7.0 6.6 5.7 4.6 4.2 3.9
Britain (BHPS)
Whole sample 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.5 6.4 6.5 5.3 4.6 4.2 4.6
16-25 16.1 17.7 17.8 16.0 12.8 13.2 12.1 11.2 10.0 10.6
26-35 7.2 8.4 6.9 6.6 5.1 5.2 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.3
36-45 4.8 6.1 7.1 6.6 4.4 4.2 3.3 2.5 2.2 2.6
46-55 7.1 7.4 7.0 6.9 5.3 5.1 3.7 2.4 3.3 3.8
56-65 10.8 8.8 8.1 10.5 7.5 8.2 6.0 6.0 3.8 4.5
Germany (GSOEP)
Whole sample 3.6 3.7 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.6 6.7 6.8 5.4 4.5
16-25 5.1 4.3 9.6 12.0 11.1 12.8 13.2 14.2 13.3 11.6
26-35 4.1 4.6 6.4 5.3 7.0 5.1 7.1 6.0 5.3 4.4
36-45 3.5 3.6 3.2 4.1 4.5 4.7 6.2 7.9 4.7 3.5
46-55 2.3 3.0 3.7 4.9 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.6 3.3 2.9
56-65 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.1 3.0 4.1 3.3 3.1 2.6
Germany (GLFS)
Whole sample 3.2 5.3 5.8 6.4 7.1 5.0
16-25 2.9 5.6 6.0 7.4 8.5 5.4
26-35 3.4 5.4 5.4 5.9 6.5 4.2
36-45 2.8 4.6 5.1 5.3 6.0 4.1
46-55 3.1 4.4 5.7 5.9 6.6 5.2
56-65 4.5 8.5 8.6 10.3 10.9 8.0
Germany (IABR)
Whole sample 4.7 5.3 7.2 8.6 8.5 9.4 9.7
16-25 3.1 3.9 5.6 7.1 6.3 7.4 7.8
26-35 4.6 5.0 6.9 8.0 7.2 8.1 8.6
36-45 3.8 4.1 5.4 6.4 6.4 7.2 8.1
46-55 4.0 4.4 5.8 7.4 7.4 8.1 8.6
56-65 15.5 16.2 20.6 22.1 23.1 22.9 20.5
Note: The comparatively high youth unemployment rates in the GSOEP (when compared to GLFS and IABR) are explained by
the lack of an ‘active search’ question in the GSOEP up to 1995 (although desire to work again and readiness to start work
immediately are asked for all through the years). Using the ‘search’ question in 1996, for example, reduces the youth
unemployment rate in the GSOEP from 12.8 to 8.9 percent. However, in oder to obtain a consistent definition over time, I have
not used this variable for the years 1996 onward. Sampling weights are used wherever applicable.
Sources: CPS-MORG; BLFS; BHPS; GSOEP; GLFS; IABR; see also Table A1; own calculations.3
Table A3: Non-Employment Rates by Age
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS)
Whole sample 29.4 29.6 29.3 28.5 28.1 27.7 27.1 26.6 26.5 26.5 27.3
16-25 40.7 41.2 40.8 40.2 39.8 40.4 40.3 39.0 39.2 38.4 40.4
26-35 22.0 22.1 22.0 21.4 20.6 20.0 19.5 18.8 18.5 18.3 19.5
36-45 18.6 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.7 18.6 17.9 18.0 17.6 17.7 18.3
46-55 24.0 24.1 23.7 22.6 22.5 21.6 20.8 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.9
56-65 50.9 51.2 50.7 50.0 49.6 48.8 47.6 47.0 46.6 46.5 45.4
Britain (BLFS)
Whole sample 29.8 29.1 28.4 27.8 26.9 26.3 25.6 25.1
16-25 41.0 40.1 39.1 38.1 37.2 36.9 36.5 36.5
26-35 25.7 24.7 24.0 23.5 21.9 21.2 20.1 19.5
36-45 20.8 21.0 20.6 20.3 19.6 18.8 18.5 17.8
46-55 25.2 24.5 24.0 23.3 23.0 22.9 22.4 22.0
56-65 42.7 42.2 41.9 41.7 41.3 40.5 39.7 38.6
Britain (BHPS)
Whole sample 30.3 32.0 32.1 31.8 30.2 30.5 29.2 27.3 27.3 27.3
16-25 36.3 41.4 41.8 41.7 41.0 40.9 38.9 33.7 33.7 35.0
26-35 23.9 24.3 23.9 22.5 21.3 21.9 19.5 18.8 18.1 17.3
36-45 17.5 20.0 21.5 20.3 18.7 17.1 16.4 16.2 15.1 16.6
46-55 23.5 24.1 22.6 23.9 23.8 24.4 24.2 21.9 22.1 23.0
56-65 56.6 58.0 59.4 60.7 56.4 59.1 58.2 56.6 57.0 54.2
Germany (GSOEP)
Whole sample 30.6 31.7 31.8 34.2 33.9 32.3 32.5 33.0 31.0 30.7
16-25 33.7 35.5 38.3 43.9 42.9 40.4 38.8 41.3 38.2 35.7
26-35 21.8 23.8 24.5 24.9 24.6 23.3 24.6 25.7 23.0 23.0
36-45 20.5 19.4 17.6 20.9 21.8 19.3 20.7 19.7 16.2 16.8
46-55 21.0 24.4 26.7 29.0 27.4 26.5 24.0 23.6 22.7 20.0
56-65 62.5 63.3 60.2 60.8 61.1 60.8 64.0 63.3 61.0 62.9
Germany (GLFS)
Whole sample 31.2 31.7 32.1 33.1 33.2 31.0
16-25 29.6 29.8 31.3 34.2 34.8 31.3
26-35 23.0 24.2 23.9 25.7 25.5 22.3
36-45 19.0 19.4 19.8 20.4 20.6 17.4
46-55 25.4 25.2 25.5 25.5 25.3 22.5
56-65 65.1 65.1 65.0 64.9 64.4 65.1
Note: The differerence in the non-employment rates for young people in the German GSOEP and GLFS data sets stems from the
fact that certain groups like conscripts or mothers on maternity leave cannot be treated consistently over time in the same way
across these two data sets. Sampling weights are used wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own
calculations.4
Table A4: Unemployment Rates by Education
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS)
Whole sample 6.8 7.5 7.0 6.1 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.9 4.6
College Degree 3.0 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.7 2.4
Some College 5.8 6.3 6.1 5.0 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.8
High School 6.9 8.2 7.7 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.1
High School Dropout 14.1 15.6 14.8 13.6 13.2 12.6 12.0 10.9 9.9 9.6 10.9
Britain (BLFS)
Whole sample 10.4 9.6 8.7 8.1 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.5
Degree 5.4 5.1 4.8 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.2 2.8
Higher - No Degree 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.0 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.8
High School (A-level) 9.1 8.2 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.8 4.6 4.2
O-level equivalent 10.2 9.3 8.7 8.6 7.4 6.8 6.7 6.3
Below O-level equivalent 14.7 13.9 12.4 11.9 10.7 9.8 9.4 8.7
Britain (BHPS)
Whole sample 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.5 6.4 6.5 5.3 4.6 4.2 4.6
Degree 3.8 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.7 4.7 3.0 3.1 2.3
Higher - No Degree 3.4 3.5 4.5 4.0 3.3 1.2 3.1 4.2 1.8 3.7
High School (A-level) 6.4 6.9 6.0 7.1 4.1 4.8 4.1 3.4 3.0 3.4
O-level equivalent 7.8 7.9 7.8 6.4 6.8 6.1 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.1
Below O-level equivalent 13.5 15.0 14.9 13.9 10.0 11.0 8.4 8.2 7.9 9.5
Germany (GSOEP)
Whole sample 3.6 3.7 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.6 6.7 6.8 5.4 4.5
Degree 3.3 2.1 2.7 4.2 4.6 5.9 3.0 5.5 2.5 3.4
Higher - No Degree 4.5 1.5 1.3 2.7 2.7 4.5 7.3 3.3 2.1 3.8
High School - Abitur 5.0 6.8 9.7 5.4 11.1 9.8 8.8 11.7 10.0 8.9
Apprenticeship 2.6 3.5 4.9 5.3 5.1 4.2 6.2 6.0 4.3 3.1
Below Apprenticeship 5.8 5.7 7.9 7.9 9.3 9.5 10.2 10.7 11.3 10.2
Germany (GLFS)
Whole sample 3.2 5.3 5.8 6.4 7.1 5.0
Degree 2.2 3.3 3.8 3.7 3.9 2.6
Meister 1.8 2.9 3.5 3.7 4.0 2.2
High School 3.2 4.7 5.0 4.6 5.6 3.4
Apprenticeship 2.8 4.9 5.4 6.2 7.1 4.9
Below Apprenticeship 5.6 9.3 10.5 11.4 12.9 9.4
Germany (IABR)
Whole sample 4.7 5.3 7.2 8.6 8.5 9.4 9.7
Degree 2.9 3.0 3.5 4.5 4.5 5.4 5.5
High School and Apprenticeship 3.3 3.0 3.8 4.7 4.1 4.7 5.0
High School (Abitur) 3.1 3.5 4.9 5.9 4.8 5.7 5.9
Apprenticeship 4.0 4.5 6.3 7.5 7.5 8.2 8.5
Below Apprenticeship 7.0 8.1 11.2 13.7 13.5 14.8 15.4
Note: Sampling weights are used wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own
calculations.5
Table A5: Non-Employment Rates by Education
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS)
Whole sample 29.4 29.6 29.3 28.5 28.1 27.7 27.1 26.6 26.5 26.5 27.3
College Degree 14.7 14.9 14.8 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.2 14.4 14.9 15.1 15.9
Some College 25.0 24.6 24.4 23.2 22.7 22.6 22.4 21.7 22.1 22.1 22.9
High School 27.6 29.4 29.4 28.7 28.3 27.6 27.0 27.0 26.8 27.0 27.7
High School Dropout 51.9 53.7 53.8 53.4 52.9 52.5 51.3 50.0 49.8 49.2 51.2
Britain (BLFS)
Whole sample 29.8 29.1 28.4 27.8 26.9 26.3 25.6 25.1
Degree 14.7 13.8 13.6 13.5 12.8 12.9 12.5 11.8
Higher - No Degree 17.0 16.5 16.7 16.3 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.4
High School (A-level) 24.9 24.6 24.1 22.9 22.3 21.8 21.1 20.7
O-level equivalent 29.1 28.0 27.5 26.8 25.9 24.9 24.8 24.7
Below O-level equivalent 39.9 39.9 39.1 39.3 38.9 38.7 38.6 38.5
Britain (BHPS)
Whole sample 30.3 32.0 32.1 31.8 30.2 30.5 29.2 27.3 27.3 27.3
Degree 13.3 15.7 15.3 17.1 14.6 17.2 15.7 14.3 15.2 14.6
Higher - No Degree 22.6 26.3 25.9 26.0 25.6 24.3 24.7 24.8 24.6 26.9
High School (A-level) 21.7 24.4 24.7 25.2 24.2 23.8 22.1 19.0 19.3 19.9
O-level equivalent 27.2 28.3 30.0 29.1 29.8 30.2 28.4 27.2 27.1 27.9
Below O-level equivalent 41.9 44.2 44.5 44.2 42.1 43.2 43.6 43.8 44.1 44.8
Germany (GSOEP)
Whole sample 30.6 31.7 31.8 34.2 33.9 32.3 32.5 33.0 31.0 30.7
Degree 16.0 14.6 14.8 15.4 15.0 15.0 13.3 15.1 11.9 14.7
Higher - No Degree 22.4 23.4 19.0 23.5 24.8 24.2 24.9 25.0 20.4 22.4
High School - Abitur 49.5 48.5 49.5 45.6 43.8 43.2 39.3 45.6 43.7 45.2
Apprenticeship 26.9 27.5 28.4 30.2 30.4 29.1 30.6 30.7 28.8 29.5
Below Apprenticeship 43.0 46.5 46.2 51.2 50.4 48.6 46.7 47.2 46.7 45.8
Germany (GLFS)
Whole sample 31.2 31.7 32.1 33.1 33.2 31.0
Degree 15.0 15.3 15.8 16.5 16.8 15.9
Meister 16.0 16.1 16.9 18.7 19.3 17.3
High School 50.2 50.0 46.0 44.3 42.8 37.2
Apprenticeship 26.1 27.4 28.6 29.9 30.9 29.6
No Prof Training 47.1 47.1 49.3 49.7 50.2 45.4
Note: Sampling weights are used wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS);
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own
calculations.6
Table A6: U.S. and British Wage Regressions (Changes in Transformed Age Coefficients
with Respect to the Base Year – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
16-25 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
-(1.8) -(1.2) (0.3) (2.1) (4.5) (6.5) (10.0) (13.7) (13.3)
26-35 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00
-(0.1) -(4.0) -(3.0) -(3.1) -(4.0) -(2.8) -(4.6) -(1.3) -(1.2)
36-45 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(1.3) (2.9) (2.3) (0.9) (1.7) (0.4) -(1.6) -(1.8) -(1.7)
46-55 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
-(0.2) (1.5) -(0.4) (0.4) -(2.6) -(3.7) -(3.4) -(6.5) -(7.5)
56-65 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.7) (1.2) (1.1) (0.3) (1.2) (0.3) (0.9) -(3.6) -(2.3)
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
16-25 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
-(2.5) -(4.3) -(6.2) -(7.8) -(7.7) -(7.1) -(6.8)
26-35 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.4) (2.1) (2.8) (3.6) (3.0) (3.5) (2.4)
36-45 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
-(0.5) (0.9) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (1.3)
46-55 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2.1) (1.1) (2.2) (3.4) (3.5) (2.4) (2.1)
56-65 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.9) (0.6) (1.2) (1.1) (1.6) (1.4) (2.0)
Britain (BHPS; Base 1991)
16-25 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(1.0) (0.0) -(1.0) -(0.1) -(2.3) -(2.1) -(2.0) -(0.9) -(0.8)
26-35 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
-(0.3) -(0.3) (1.0) (0.3) -(0.1) (0.5) -(0.2) -(0.5) (0.1)
36-45 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
-(1.6) -(0.8) -(0.6) (0.5) (0.9) (1.5) (1.5) (1.7) (1.4)
46-55 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.6) (0.8) -(0.2) -(0.8) (1.9) (0.7) (0.5) (0.7) (0.8)
56-65 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.07
(0.1) (0.4) (0.8) (0.0) (0.0) -(0.4) (0.3) -(1.1) -(1.8)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey
(BLFS); British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); own calculations.7
Table A7: German Wage Regressions (Changes in Transformed Age Coefficients with
Respect to 1991 – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Germany (GSOEP)
16-25 (0.0) (1.3) -(0.8) -(1.3) -(1.2) -(2.7) -(4.0) -(3.0) -(2.5)
-0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
26-35 -(0.4) -(1.4) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (1.2) (0.8) (0.8) -(0.2)
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
36-45 (0.1) -(0.3) (0.7) (1.3) (0.3) (0.5) (1.8) (0.0) (0.6)
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
46-55 -(0.7) (0.3) -(0.8) -(0.9) -(0.1) (0.1) -(0.5) (0.1) -(0.1)
0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.08
56-65 (1.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.6) (1.0) (0.8) (2.1) (2.3) (2.2)
0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07
Germany (GLFS)
16-25 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
-(0.3) -(2.1) -(4.0) -(7.1) -(5.6)
26-35 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
-(3.1) -(6.8) -(2.9) -(1.9) -(3.1)
36-45 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.9) (1.1) -(1.7) -(1.7) -(4.9)
46-55 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(2.8) (6.1) (4.2) (6.1) (3.2)
56-65 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.09
-(0.5) (2.6) (6.5) (7.2) (15.8)
Germany (IABR)
16-25 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(11.8) (8.8) (5.2) (5.2) (3.4) -(2.1)
26-35 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
-(4.2) -(2.0) -(2.3) -(3.3) -(2.5) -(0.6)
36-45 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
-(7.8) -(7.1) -(6.2) -(5.6) -(5.3) -(2.5)
46-55 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
-(3.4) -(1.4) (1.6) (1.9) (1.9) (2.9)
56-65 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
(1.3) -(0.2) (0.9) (1.2) (2.6) (4.2)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); German
Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations.8
Table A8: U.S. and British Unemployment Regressions (Changes in Transformed Age
Coefficients with Respect to the Base Year – Corresponding t-values in
Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
16-25 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04
(0.8) (1.7) (3.7) (3.8) (4.6) (5.3) (4.3) (3.8) (2.5)
26-35 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02
-(1.7) -(1.7) -(0.7) -(1.5) -(1.2) -(2.1) -(2.7) -(4.0) -(1.9)
36-45 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.5) (0.6) -(0.3) (0.1) -(0.1) -(1.0) -(1.2) (0.9) -(0.7)
46-55 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(1.2) -(0.5) -(2.6) -(1.1) -(2.1) -(0.4) -(0.6) (0.1) -(0.4)
56-65 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
-(0.6) (0.3) (0.7) -(0.8) -(0.5) -(0.8) (1.9) (0.5) (1.7)
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
16-25 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09
-(0.4) -(0.2) (1.7) (3.5) (5.4) (4.0) (5.9)
26-35 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
-(0.4) -(0.5) -(0.2) -(1.5) -(0.7) -(1.2) -(3.2)
36-45 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.4) (2.1) (1.8) (0.5) (0.2) (1.0) (0.9)
46-55 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.0) -(0.5) -(2.4) -(1.3) -(2.2) -(0.5) -(0.5)
56-65 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07
(0.6) -(1.4) -(0.9) -(0.9) -(2.3) -(3.4) -(2.6)
Britain (BHPS; Base 1991)
16-25 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.01
(0.3) (0.5) -(0.7) -(0.8) -(0.7) (0.5) (0.9) (0.4) (0.1)
26-35 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04
(0.5) -(1.1) -(1.2) -(0.7) -(0.6) -(0.7) (0.1) (0.4) (0.5)
36-45 0.05 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01
(1.0) (2.4) (1.9) (1.3) (1.1) (0.9) (0.4) (0.0) (0.2)
46-55 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 0.00
-(0.3) -(0.3) -(0.1) (0.3) (0.1) -(0.4) -(1.6) (0.2) (0.0)
56-65 -0.19 -0.22 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.16 -0.16
-(2.2) -(2.2) -(0.2) -(0.4) -(0.1) -(0.4) (0.2) -(1.2) -(1.2)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey
(BLFS); British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); own calculations.9
Table A9: German Unemployment Regressions (Changes in Transformed Age Coefficients
with Respect to 1991 – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Germany (GSOEP)
16-25 -0.13 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.26
-(1.2) (1.9) (2.8) (1.7) (2.5) (1.4) (2.0) (2.3) (2.5)
26-35 0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.14 -0.07 -0.15 -0.06 -0.08
(0.4) (0.8) -(0.9) (0.3) -(1.5) -(0.8) -(1.6) -(0.6) -(1.0)
36-45 -0.02 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.10
-(0.2) -(1.9) -(1.2) -(1.2) -(1.0) -(0.4) (0.8) -(0.3) -(1.1)
46-55 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.00
(0.7) (0.2) (1.1) (0.6) (0.9) (0.0) -(0.3) -(0.7) (0.0)
56-65 0.01 -0.09 -0.25 -0.25 -0.06 0.00 -0.13 -0.02 0.03
(0.1) -(0.4) -(1.2) -(1.2) -(0.3) (0.0) -(0.7) -(0.1) (0.2)
Germany (GLFS)
16-25 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.05
(4.3) (3.2) (6.1) (6.7) (2.8)
26-35 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10
-(0.7) -(4.7) -(4.8) -(5.6) -(6.8)
36-45 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
-(0.6) -(0.3) -(2.5) -(1.9) -(2.0)
46-55 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.06
-(4.7) (0.9) -(1.0) -(1.0) (3.7)
56-65 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.10
(3.5) (1.7) (4.2) (3.6) (4.5)
Germany (IABR)
16-25 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05
(3.7) (4.4) (5.5) (2.4) (3.6) (2.9)
26-35 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
-(1.2) (0.4) -(1.6) -(4.6) -(4.0) -(3.5)
36-45 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
-(1.8) -(2.9) -(3.2) -(1.1) -(0.7) (1.8)
46-55 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03
-(0.1) -(2.1) (0.4) (3.3) (2.4) (2.7)
56-65 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.17
-(2.4) -(0.9) -(3.8) (0.1) -(3.7) -(10.2)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); German
Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations.10
Table A10: U.S. and British Wage Regressions (Changes in Transformed Education
Coefficients with Respect to the Base Year – Corresponding t-values in
Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
College 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06
(1.4) (4.7) (6.1) (5.9) (6.8) (8.5) (11.4) (12.9) (14.1)
Some College 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.7) -(1.1) (0.0) (0.5) -(0.2) (0.4) -(0.6) -(0.3) (0.8)
High School 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
-(1.1) -(0.4) -(1.9) -(2.9) -(3.5) -(4.4) -(7.2) -(7.4) -(8.8)
High School Dropout -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
-(1.2) -(4.0) -(4.9) -(4.3) -(3.9) -(5.4) -(3.8) -(6.0) -(7.0)
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
Degree 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.9) -(0.9) (2.2) (0.6) (1.4) (0.9) (1.4)
Higher - No Degree 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
-(0.3) -(1.0) (0.1) -(0.9) -(1.7) -(1.5) -(2.2)
High School (A-level) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.1) -(0.1) -(0.4) (3.0) (2.8) (2.5) (2.4)
O-level equivalent 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.0) (0.6) -(1.1) -(1.7) -(2.2) -(3.0) -(2.8)
Below O-level equivalent 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
-(0.5) (0.7) -(0.2) -(1.2) -(0.8) (0.3) (0.3)
Britain (BHPS; Base 1991)
Degree 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03
(1.8) (2.6) (0.5) (0.5) (1.4) (1.2) (0.5) (1.2) (1.3)
Higher -
No Degree
-0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04
-(2.0) (0.1) -(1.5) -(1.2) -(2.3) -(1.8) -(1.7) -(2.5) -(1.1)
High School
(A-level)
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.2) (0.2) -(0.1) -(1.3) -(1.0) -(2.0) -(2.0) -(1.8) -(2.0)
O-level equivalent 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.5) -(0.5) (1.3) (1.0) (1.7) (0.4) (0.7) (1.5) -(0.6)
Below O-level
equivalent
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
-(0.7) -(1.2) -(0.5) (0.6) -(0.2) (1.4) (1.5) (0.8) (1.9)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey
(BLFS); British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); own calculations.11
Table A11: German Wage Regressions (Changes in Transformed Education Coefficients
with Respect to 1991 – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Germany (GSOEP)
Degree 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07
-(0.1) (0.2) -(0.7) -(1.6) -(1.6) -(3.4) -(3.3) -(1.4) -(1.5)
Higher - No Degree -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.06
-(0.4) (1.2) -(0.4) (0.7) -(0.9) -(0.6) -(0.8) -(0.6) (1.6)
High School - Abitur 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
(0.6) (1.3) (1.6) (2.5) (0.4) (0.8) (0.0) -(0.2) -(0.2)
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
-(0.7) (1.0) (0.0) (2.1) (3.6) (1.6) (2.9) (2.8) (3.5)
Below Apprenticeship 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08
(0.8) -(2.4) (0.2) -(2.0) -(2.4) (0.8) -(0.3) -(1.4) -(2.8)
Germany (GLFS)
Higher 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
-(0.3) -(6.1) -(11.2) -(14.5) -(13.6)
Meister 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
-(0.7) -(2.3) -(4.8) -(5.9) -(1.4)
High School 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05
(5.4) (6.7) (9.0) (9.4) (8.4)
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-(3.2) -(1.9) -(1.1) -(1.0) -(3.4)
Below Apprenticeship 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04
(1.4) (4.4) (7.5) (9.9) (10.1)
Germany (IABR)
Degree 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(3.8) (3.7) (3.5) (5.6) (2.6) (1.5)
High School and
Apprenticeship
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(3.1) (4.2) (3.7) (3.1) (4.2) (4.3)
High School (Abitur) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.01
(1.4) (1.1) (0.9) (2.3) (3.4) -(0.4)
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(3.0) (4.9) (6.6) (7.3) (8.6) (10.7)
Below Apprenticeship -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
-(6.8) -(8.8) -(10.4) -(12.4) -(13.1) -(13.2)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); German
Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations.12
Table A12: U.S. and British Unemployment Regressions (Changes in Transformed
Education Coefficients with Respect to the Base Year – Corresponding t-
values in Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)
College Degree 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.10
(0.9) (2.6) (3.2) (2.0) (1.7) (4.1) (5.1) (3.5) (6.2)
Some College 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(1.1) -(1.2) -(2.4) -(2.0) -(1.3) -(2.9) -(1.0) -(2.2) -(1.8)
High School -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03
-(1.1) -(1.2) -(1.2) (0.0) -(0.7) -(0.6) -(2.4) -(0.3) -(2.8)
High School Dropout -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
-(1.4) -(0.6) (0.2) -(0.2) (0.1) -(1.5) -(3.0) -(2.1) -(3.0)
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)
Degree 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
(0.5) (1.0) (2.2) (1.6) (2.7) (1.5) (1.1)
Higher - No Degree 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06
(0.4) (1.7) (1.3) (0.7) (0.0) (1.1) (1.9)
High School (A-level) -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
-(1.2) -(1.0) -(3.5) -(3.8) -(4.7) -(4.7) -(4.7)
O-level equivalent -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
-(0.6) (0.4) (1.6) (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.1)
Below O-level
equivalent
0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.9) -(1.4) -(0.6) (0.9) (1.3) (0.8) (0.5)
Britain (BHPS; Base 1991)
Degree 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.29 0.24 0.33 0.16 0.19 -0.01
(1.0) (0.5) (1.1) (2.4) (2.0) (2.7) (1.2) (1.4) -(0.1)
Higher - No Degree -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 -0.33 0.13 0.37 -0.03 0.21
-(0.4) (0.7) (0.4) (0.6) -(1.7) (0.7) (2.0) -(0.1) (1.2)
High School (A-level) -0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
-(0.8) -(1.6) (0.5) -(1.3) (0.0) -(0.1) -(0.6) -(0.6) -(0.3)
O-level equivalent -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08
-(0.7) -(0.4) -(1.6) (0.8) (0.4) -(0.8) -(0.9) -(0.1) -(1.0)
Below O-level
equivalent
0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.03
(1.1) (1.1) -(0.1) -(1.4) -(0.4) -(1.4) -(0.6) -(0.2) (0.5)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey
(BLFS); British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); own calculations.13
Table A13: German Unemployment Regressions (Changes in Transformed Education
Coefficients with Respect to 1991 – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Germany (GSOEP)
Degree -0.24 -0.24 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.34 -0.08 -0.29 -0.09
-(1.2) -(1.4) -(0.4) -(0.5) (0.6) -(2.0) -(0.5) -(1.6) -(0.6)
Higher - No Degree -0.52 -0.70 -0.39 -0.47 -0.19 -0.04 -0.46 -0.52 -0.16
-(2.3) -(3.4) -(1.9) -(2.3) -(0.8) -(0.2) -(2.2) -(2.5) -(0.9)
High School - Abitur 0.17 0.11 -0.22 0.18 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.10 0.09
(0.9) (0.5) -(0.8) (0.7) (0.3) -(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
Apprenticeship 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.07 -0.01
(2.4) (3.1) (2.7) (1.6) (0.4) (2.0) (1.4) (1.5) -(0.1)
Below Apprenticeship -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.10 0.09
-(0.3) -(0.5) -(1.5) -(0.3) -(0.5) -(0.6) -(0.2) (1.0) (1.1)
Germany (GLFS)
Higher -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15
-(2.6) -(2.7) -(5.2) -(6.8) -(5.9)
Meister -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15
-(1.8) -(0.8) -(2.1) -(2.8) -(4.6)
High School -0.07 -0.08 -0.16 -0.13 -0.16
-(2.2) -(2.4) -(5.0) -(4.2) -(5.2)
Apprenticeship 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05
(3.4) (2.2) (5.6) (6.7) (6.8)
Below Apprenticeship 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06
(1.0) (1.9) (2.5) (2.8) (4.0)
Germany (IABR)
Degree -0.04 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11
-(1.4) -(4.9) -(4.6) -(4.1) -(3.1) -(4.1)
High School and
Apprenticeship
-0.09 -0.13 -0.13 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18
-(2.2) -(3.1) -(3.2) -(4.2) -(4.1) -(4.3)
High School (Abitur) -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08
-(0.2) (0.0) -(0.3) -(1.5) -(1.1) -(1.4)
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.5) (0.7) -(1.7) -(1.3) -(2.4) -(2.5)
Below Apprenticeship 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
(1.4) (3.9) (6.4) (6.5) (6.8) (7.8)
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling
weights wherever applicable.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); German
Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations. 
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